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Abstract 
Inter-clan conflicts wi thin orthem Israel' s Arab community may pit dozens, hundreds, 
sometimes thousands of people against each other in revenge and counter-revenge cycles 
that can take years to resolve. Because disputants' clans often li ve in close proximity to 
each other, third party interveners- Sulha (Settlement) Makers, mitigate against possible 
revenge attacks, sometimes command the extended family of the perceived perpetrator to 
leave their homes and move to another vi llage or town. This exile (tarhil in Arabic) often 
impacts dozens of family members (mostly women and children), and can extend years, 
sometimes decades. Such enforced exi le has a severe impact on the women (and other 
members) of the exiled family. In exi le, such women and their families are tom away 
from their organic living environment: they and their children are often transplanted into 
an unwelcoming new setting where they have to reconstruct life almost from scratch. Fur-
thermore, these very same women are excluded from any formal participation in the reso-
lution of such conflicts which almost always occur through the Sulha, an inter-intra clan, 
customary justice application practiced, wi th variations, throughout the Muslim/Arab 
world. This paper uses interviews literature, case studies, and analysis to locate and de-
scribe the ways in which inter-intra clan disputes impact women in orthem Israel's Ar-
ab community, and then locates and describes the informal yet influential cultural and 
functional ways in which women impact the process and outcome of Sulha, during and 
after the confl ict. 
What is Sulha? 
Sulha (reconci liation in Arabic) is a 1,600-year old, prevalent dispute resolution 
tradition, used primarily to facilitate inter and intra-clan (Hamula) 1 dispute man-
agement/resolution within clan-based Arab and Muslim cu ltures throughout the 
Hamula is the Arabic word for a clan, a prevalent functional unit in tribal Arab cultures, consist-
of three to seven generations of one family related through the paternal line 
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Middle East and other regions (Othman, 2007). Sulha is practiced not only 
among Muslims, but also among and between Christian and Druze Arabs. 
After a conflict erupts, the Sulha serves to facilitate the transformation of the 
attitudes of the disputants ' clan (particularly the victim's clan) from a desire for 
revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge-counter revenge 
cycles), to a willingness to forgive (Jabbour, 1993; F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. 
June 14, 2009 2). 
Whereas Western Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) diverged over the 
years into several approaches, central among which are mediation and arbitration 
(Barrett & Barrett, 2004; Abu-Nimer, 1996), Sulha employs a mix of mediation 
and arbitration approaches used interchangeably throughout the process . 
In addition to its unique mediation-arbitration approach, the practice of Sulha 
informs our knowledge of Muslim and Middle Eastern conflict management in 
other areas such as confidentiality, neutrality, and venting-all practiced within 
the Sulha process in ways different from their practice in Western ADR (Pely, 
2008). 
The Patriarchal Context of Inter-Clan Dispute Resolution in 
Israel's Arab Community 
Israel's Arab community (Muslims, Christians and Druze) are part of Arab cul-
ture. Their customs, including customary justice practices such as the Sulha, 
draw (with local variations) from the prevailing Arab culture of the Middle East 
(Abu-Nimer, 1996). 
The cultures of the Middle East and much of the Arab and Muslim world are 
based primarily on patriarchal values and norms (Suad, 1996; Abu-Nimer, 1996). 
Although there is scant, uncorroborated evidence of women playing a formal role 
as mediators and in some instances in pre-Islamic Middle East (Smith, 1985), 
today the Sulha employs-at least formally-a strictly male cast: third-party 
interveners-a group of dignitaries who manage the Sulha process, who are 
called the Sulha Committee (Jaha in Arabic) and disputants' representatives are 
all males, and only males are allowed to act as witnesses in front of the Jaha. The 
only formal access women have to the Jaha-and through it to the Sulha pro-
cess-Is through their agnate3 relatives (F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. June 14, 
2009).4 
2 Mr. Farage Khneifes is Su/ha maker (member of the Su /ha Committee (Jaha) in the North of 
Israel). Semi-structured interviews with author took place on the follow ing dates : July 24, 2007; 
June 14, 2009; and July 15,20 11 , in Shefar ' am, Israel. English transcri pt available. 
3 Agnate is a relative whose relationship can be traced exclusively through males, (e.g. , father, 
brother, son) (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary). 
4 Farage Kheifess changed his claim recently and is holding now that women are allowed to give 
formal testimony in front of the Jaha, but the author was unable to corroborate th is claim. 
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Women may be excluded from formal participation in dispute resolution in 
the Middle East, yet disputes and their management and resolution impact their 
lives in many ways: their husbands and sons become potential targets of revenge 
ki llings; they (women and their families) are sometimes exiled from the conflict 
region-to help reduce friction-resulting in economic, social and cultural dislo-
cation for them and their families. 
There is evidence that the Sulha is a successful process (Gellman & Vuino-
vich, 2008; Lang, 2002; F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. June 14, 2009). Yet, formally 
at least, the Sulha does not have any mechanism designed to accommodate the 
concerns of women. This paper locates and identifies the exact instances and 
mechanisms where women 's informal impact takes place, including pre-Sulha 
maneuvering, the selection of Su1ha Committee members (Jaha), deliberations, 
outcome (formal agreement) and post-reconciliation (lathat, 2007; F. Khneifess, 
Pers. Comm. June 14, 2009; XXX, Pers. Comm. June 3, 2009\ informing our 
knowledge of the interaction between formal and informal applications in tradi-
tional dispute management/resolution settings. 
The terms "formal " and " informal" as used in this paper are researcher-
generated, but are directly related to Jaha-associated definitions of "formal " and 
·'informal" parts of the process . The term "formal" in the context of this paper, 
therefore, denotes those aspects and stages of the Sulha process that are pro-
scribed by its practitioners as necessary for the application to be considered com-
plete and bind ing, culturally and within Sharia (Islamic law). This includes all 
designated rituals, meetings and deliberations between the Jaha and the dispu-
tants' representatives (e.g., the Sulha ceremony). Everything else is "informal" 
(e.g., communication of women with individual Jaha members-not with the 
Jaha as a formal body). 
Relevant Literature 
There is a significant amount of literature that examines various aspects of 
the lives of Arab women in Israel , including the duality of subordination and 
empowerment (Cohen & Savaya, 2003; Batrice, 2000; Ginat, 1982; Levy-
Weiner, 2003 ; Gorkin, 1996; Hasan, 2002; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, l999a, 2004; 
halhoub-Kevorkian & Erez, 2002; Ahmed-Kasem, 2002; Kanaaneh, 2002; 
Forte, 2001 ; Yahya-Younis, 2002; Abu-Baker, 2002; Erdreich & Rapoport, 2002; 
Erdreich, 2003 ; Herzog, 2004). These studies use different approaches, from 
omparison to Western feminist models, through cultural-relativistic approach, a 
linkage between fam ilial, community and state patriarchal agencies of oppres-
5 Because of a concern for the well being of some of people who agreed to discuss issues which are 
currently considered taboo in Israel ' s Arab community (because they are perceived as challenges to 
patriarchy) the author uses several devices to .preserve the anonymity of many of the interviewees, 
including the use of letters such as XXX and YYY to substitute for real names. 
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sion, and highlighting women's "creative forms of resistance" (Sa ' ar, 2006). Yet, 
none of the above examines the interaction between women and traditional dis-
pute resolution processes in general or the agency of Sulha in pa1ticular. 
It may be that literature examining the place of women in Sulha is sparse 
because literature examining Sulha in general is sparse and focuses mostly on 
comparison between Sulha and Western ADR (Abu-Nimer, 1993; Irani, 1999; 
Lang, 2002) or on other gender-related issues, such as "honor killings" (Hasan, 
2002). 
Elias J. Jabbour, a veteran Sulha practitioner from the town of Shefaamer in 
Northern Israel , includes a chapter (Chapter 6) titled: "Women in the Culture of 
Sulha: Arab Traditions and Values" in his book: Sulha-Palestinian Traditional 
Peacemaking Process. The chapter focuses on the general place of women in 
Arab culture. However, it does not contain a detailed examination and/or analysis 
of the way Sulha impacts women and the ways women interact with Sulha and 
impact it. 
The Impact oflnter-Cian Conflict on Women 
Disputes within Israel's Arab community, particularly blood disputes (those in-
volving death or severe injury), have a significant impact on the immediate and 
extended family of the perceived perpetrator. Inter-clan bonds and the traditions 
of dispute management in this region decree that the male members of the vic-
tim's clan have a cultural obligation to restore the lost honor of their clan by 
avenging the death/injury oftheir clan member (Jabbour, 1993; Ginat, 1987).6 
Furthermore, the extended family of the perceived perpetrator (sometimes 
more than one nuclear family), including dozens of women and children are 
sometimes required to uproot en mass soon after the eruption of a conflict and go 
into a temporary, extended or even permanent exile, away from the victim's fam-
ily (I. M'bada, 2011, Pers. Comm. Nov. 13).7 
The authority to order such an exile is in the hands of the Sulha Committee 
(Jaha), a group of local and regional dignitaries entrusted in such cases with facil-
itating a reconciliation between (and within) disputing clans. They (the Jaha) 
decide to instruct an exile if they have reason to believe that the continuing pres-
ence of the perpetrator's family in close proximity to the victim's clan may result 
in attempted revenge attacks by members of the victim's clan against the member 
of the perpetrator's clan (F, Khneifes, 2011 Pers. Comm. July 15). The authority 
ofthe Jaha is informal, but it is rarely if at all rebuffed. 
6 Jabbour uses the term "Circles of Responsibility;" Ginat uses the term "co-liable.'' 
7 Based on the author's semi-structured interview with Ibrahim M'bada Naum (Abu M'bada), 
Su/ha maker (member of the Su/ha Committee (Jaha) in the North of Israel). Interview took place 
on ovember 13,2011, in Shefar ' am, Israel. Transcript available in English. 
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In a clan-based rural culture, such as that of Northern Israel ' s Arabs, in many 
cases, people live all their lives next to their kin group for generations, and life-
long social networks are a center of people 's economic, social and religious lives. 
Transplanting to a new environment represents, particularly for women, a major 
life-change, including loss of social network, and loss of mobility and economic 
well-being-since in many cases women are not allowed to leave the village to 
work in unfam il iar settings without an agnate relative 's escort. This life change is 
particularly significant for women, who shoulder a significant part of the burden 
of caring for the fam ily ' s children, elderly, health care, feeding, and many other 
family and clan-related activities, and rely heavily on social network's suppot1 
(Hertz-Lazarowitz & Shapira, 2005). 
Impact of Conflict-Related Exile on Women8-Case Studies 
This section describes and analyzes two cases of extended family exile precipi-
tated by inter-clan blood disputes. The cases highlight the disruption caused by 
the exile, as well as provide insight on the place of the exile in the resolution of 
disputes. 
Case Study 1 
In September 1975, an inter-clan dispute erupted between two feuding clans 
(Hamud and Rian) from the Arab village of Kabul in the North of Israel. The 
dispute started when a member of the Hamud clan (Muslim Arabs) murdered 
three members of the Rian clan (Muslim Arabs). 
In an attempt to preempt revenge killings, the Sulha Committee ordered the 
immediate ex ile of the killer ' s extended family (about 40 people, mostly women 
and children). The family moved to the village of Kafar Manda, about 15 kilome-
ters (I 0 miles) from Kabul. The exiled family lived in Kfar Manda for 33 years, 
until the conflict between the two clans was resolved in 2008. 
For 30 years, the Rian clan refused any attempts at mediation, and refused all 
offers of temporary ceasefire. And indeed, in 2005, one of the murdered men 's 
sons (Wallid Rian, who was two years old when the di spute erupted and his fa-
ther was killed), reta liated by killing the head of the Hamud clan (who was ru-
mored to have been actively involved in the killing of the Riam men 30y years 
earlier) . Wallid was consequently sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, but his act 
created a "balance" of sorts, which energized eff011s for inter-clan reconciliation 
and a reconciliation agreement was reached in 2008. 
Following the resolution of the conflict, and as part of the reconciliation 
agreement, the exiled Hamud family was allowed to return to their home villages 
The family" s children are also significantly impacted, but this is not the focus of this paper. 
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and resume life across the street from the Rian clan.9 Some of the Hamud famil 
actually remained in Kafar Manda, having settled there over the 30-year exile 
when they purchased land, started local businesses and even intermarried into 
local families. 10 
Farage Khneifess, a member of the Sulha Committee, who remembered the 
this dispute in detail , stressed that as a rule, the Sulha Committee does not ever 
force the exile of women and children; yet he conceded that " if men leave, wom-
en and children will follow as a matter of course, so the end result is the exile of 
women and children as well as men ." 
Forced exile, along with the rigidly enforced modesty codes that severely 
limit the mobility and economic independence of women (Antoun, 1968) disrupt 
essential mutual assistance links (women from neighboring and friend ly families) 
and inter-family links between women relatives (mother, sister, aunt), 11 by reduc-
ing and limiting the number of people (women) that exiled women can interact 
with and expect to receive assistance from. The resultant impact on the women of 
the exiled family is probably more pronounced in the short term, when the impact 
is economic and social. After all, a whole family finds itself, sometimes over-
night, cast into a situation that requires them (mostly the family' s women) to 
manage the family's affairs in a new, unfamiliar, sometimes even marginally 
hostile location. Also, the fact that the exiled family's children usually stop going 
to school, at least for a while (through a combination of administrative hurdles 
and resultant exile-related trauma), increases the burden on the women of the 
family, who are solely responsible for the care of children (F. Khneifes, 2011, 
Pers. Comm. July 15). In the long run, it is reasonable to assume that the at least 
some members of exiled families gradually integrate into the host community; 
the children start going to school eventually (though it may take months), the 
women create a new social network or integrate into existing ones in the new 
location, and economically dislocated family members find new revenue generat-
ing sources in the new place, reducing the economic hardship (1. M'bada, Pers. 
Comm. Nov. 13 (20 11); F. Khneifes, Pers. Comm. July 15 (20 11)). 
Case Study 2 
On July 20, 2007, the Sulha Committee instructed Rym Mousa, along with 70 
family members, including 53 children under the age of 18, and nine women, to 
leave their home village of Dir AI Asad, in the North of Israel. The order came 
two days after two members of the Mousa clan were detained by police on suspi-
9 http ://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3532749,00.html (Hebrew) 
1° F, Khneifes, 20 II Pers. Comm. July 15. 
11 Samira Haj (Haj , 1992) writes about women in Arab rural settlements that: '"Female relatives 
such as mother, sister, and aunt continue to serve as a backup resource to share household tasks, 
especially the care of preschool children ." This describes the situation in non-exile circumstances. 
Of course, once part of the family moves away, such backup services are denied . 
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cion of killing Amar AI lndi (age 35). Rym is the wife of one of eight male 
members of the Mousa clan who were ordered into exile. Since then, the exiled 
family has been living in rented accommodation in the nearby Arab town of 
Sachnin and other villages in the area. 12 
The forced exile resulted in the removal of several dozen children from their 
schools. The kids remained at home with their mothers. 
This case exemplifies the extended impact of the forced exile on the exiled 
women. There is direct impact when these women are removed from their 
homes; their daily routine is disrupted, as they are disconnected from the network 
of family and friends that they lived with, and are cast into an isolated setting, 
where they have little or no social contacts, and are sometimes looked upon as 
"relatives of criminals" (F. Khneifes, 2011, Pers. Comm. July 15). Those women, 
some of whom, before the exile, worked outside their homes, helping with the 
family's finances, lose their workplace in many cases because the increased dis-
tance prevents them from continuing to work. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that women are resentful of the forced exile prac-
tice. Rym said in an interview with an Israeli newspaper: "We understand the 
pain of the murdered man's mother. He's her only child. But why do we have to 
pay for this by being exiled from our homes? I don't understand the logic of 
this." 13 
This is the first time that women came out publically, using a national media 
platform (the country ' s largest newspaper) to voice opposition to the practice of 
forced exile. In the context of the strictly patriarchal practices of Israel's rural 
Arab community, this is quite a daring and unusual move, and if it repeats itself 
(women voicing public opposition to exile) it will require the attention of the 
patriarchal leadership, both in the Arab communities and from the Sulha Com-
mittee. 
Yet, measured against the threat of a retaliatory revenge attack by the vic-
tim's family, it is likely that the practice will continue, though, Sulha practition-
ers are said to "do their best to avoid sending families into exile" (F. Khneifes, 
_Oil, Pers. Comm. July 15). 
This conflict was resolved in July 20 ll; yet, according to the Sulha agree-
ment, the exiled part of the Mousa clan must remain in exile in the town of 
achnin until the summer of 2016, when they will be allowed to return to Dir AI 
ssad. 
n http://www. haaretz.co. illmisc/ 1.1552170 (Hebrew). 
'
3 http://www.haaretz.co.i llmisc/1. 1552170 (Hebrew) 
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The Impact of Women on Inter-Clan Dispute Resolution (Sulha) 
This section describes and analyzes the influence of women on the process of 
Sulha, the customary path to inter-clan dispute resolution. An analysis of the 
presence and influence of women within the Sulha process demonstrates that 
despite the informal nature of the influence of women (on ly men are allowed to 
formally participate in the Sulha process), the women ' s influence on the process 
and its outcome is significant and material. 
Women's Influence on Pre-Sulha Stages 
Multiple interviews with women involved in Sulha situations provide evidence of 
their involvement with Sulha as early as the pre-deliberation stages. The in-
volvement takes place in several areas including: 
I) Venting (mostly on the victim ' s family side) 
2) Decision on the makeup of the Jaha 
3) Agreement to stati the fonnal Sulha process, by agreeing to Atwa and 
Hodna (a token of goodwill , and a ceasefire, conversely) 
4) Financing the process 
Venting 
Venting is, apparently, a necessary condition to enable the victim ' s family to 
subscribe to a non-violent attempt at dispute resolution- and women are the 
main participants in this stage. Elias Jabbour writes about it (Jabbour, 1993: 47): 
"Grief work, in many cases, must be enabled by the Jaha to make way for peace" 
(page number). 
Women from the victim ' s family get a chance to vent their (and their fami-
ly's) anger, frustration and sense of humiliation, as part in this pre-Sulha stage. 
This is the first contact between the victim's family and the dignitaries who rep-
resent what may later become the formal Sulha Committee (Jaha). 
This is the only part of the Sulha where women ' s participation is recognized 
(even somewhat encouraged). 
After the offender's family representatives sign the Tafwith (authorization) 
document, authorizing the initiation of the Sulha process, and requesting the Jaha 
to contact the victim ' s side. The dignitaries approach for the first time the vic-
tim's family. They stand at the doorway and say, "We were sent and are author-
ized as Jaha by the killer' s family , and we invite you to consider us" (Jabbour, 
1993). It is important to note that the Sulha makers are not using direct authority, 
and in no way try to imply that they are instructing the vict im' s family to join the 
Sulha process. On the contrary, the Sulha makers mask their cultural authority, 
and elevated social position under a nan·ative of uncommon politeness. This pos-
ture is designed to increase the victim ' s family confidence, enhance their sense of 
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respect and control, reduce their sense of helplessness, and ultimately channel 
them, with ample cultural support, away from the instinctive, and immediate urge 
to avenge, and into the option of conciliation and ultimate forgiveness-
something that is almost unthinkable at this stage. 
At this preliminary point, occasionally, the women and youngsters of the 
victim' s family may be allowed to vent their frustration on the (male) dignitaries 
of the Jaha by abusing them verbally, sometimes in quite an aggressive manner. 
This is a behavior that goes well beyond all accepted norms in a strict patriarchal 
environment in general , and in connection with the Sulha in particular. This ex-
traordinary deviation from the norm provides the victim ' s family with a signifi-
cant (and public) outlet for their rage, together with an acknowledgment of their 
suffering, and sympathy with their need to recover their lost honor (Lang, 2002). 
Determining the Jaha's Makeup 
Deciding on the makeup of the Jaha is a process that includes ritualistic elements 
and behind-the-scene negotiations and bargaining. At this stage of the Sulha, the 
women ' s participation moves to the background, where it will stay for the dura-
tion of the process. 
The Jaha draws its power and authority primarily from the status of its mem-
bers within the community at large, and with the disputants ' families in particu-
lar. Also, as described above, the Jaha never acts without the explicit formal au-
thorization of all the disputants . The role of the interveners is to navigate the 
demanding transformative path of moving the disputants from pure desire to 
avenge, to a non-belligerence stance, and finally to a formalized agreement to 
forgive. 
The makeup of the Jaha changes from case to case. The number of Jaha 
members can be from one to "about 20" (Jabbour, 1993). The aspiration is to 
avoid a top-heavy committee, but to include in it a number of members that re-
fl ects the will of the disputants ' families, and may consequently be able (large 
enough in number and significant enough in social standing) to leverage that 
position to move the disputants toward a solution. 
While the offender ' s and victim ' s families are not allowed to stipulate condi-
tions for the operation of the Jaha, they have some input regarding its makeup. 
For example, the disputants can veto the participation of individual Jaha mem-
rs (F. Khneifess 2007, Pers. Comm. 24 July; M. Abu Saaluk 2007, Pers. 
Comm. 12 July 14). 
Women, at this stage, stay in their homes. Their husbands, brothers, and un-
les represent the entire family. They negotiate with the (temporary) Jaha, and 
port to their respective clan about the proposed makeup of the (permanent) 
- Based on semi-structured interview with Sheikh Mahmud Abu saaluk, a long-time Sulha Maker. 
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Jaha. On occasion, a woman objects to a proposed Jaha member, because of past 
conflicts, because she thinks that the particular person is negatively disposed 
toward the family, hamula, or the family ' s religion (Jaha members tend to be 
from more than one religious origin). If a woman succeeds in convincing her 
male relatives of the need to exclude and/or include a specific Jaha member in 
the group, they (the men) will return to the dignitaries and convey the point, ei-
ther disclosing the women's objections or (more likely) presenting the objections 
as their own. At this preliminary stage, the Jaha tends to accept such objections. 
Sulha makers interviewed for this paper indicated that in many cases women 
play an active role in determining the composition of the Jaha. "Without the tacit 
agreement of women-folk, no Jaha will start operating," said one Sulha maker 
(Anonymous, Pers. Comm. June 8, (2009),). There is an admission here of the 
centrality of women to the process (despite their fonnal exclusion), and also of 
the fact that both the community' s men-folk and the members of the Jaha recog-
nize this centrality and accommodate it (though informally and anonymously). 
We will see later, in the responses to the questionnaire, that both men and women 
are quite aware of women's informal role in Sulha. 
Entering the Hodna (Ceasefire Agreement) 
Testimonies from Sulha makers indicate that in many cases, the women of the 
victim's family argue forcefully with their male relatives to postpone agreement 
to initiate a ceasefire agreement (Hodna). The women are said to do so in part for 
emotional reasons when they feel unable to accept a formal-though tempo-
rary- abdication of right to avenge the dishonor and the loss of life (of a son or a 
husband, in some cases). There is also a practical aspect to the pressure exerted 
by the victim's family to postpone agreement to the initiation of a Hodna: it de-
nies the offender the opportunity to appear in court, claim that a Sulha process is 
ongoing, and that there is no further cause to hold him in detention . This is be-
cause Israeli law obliges the comt to examine substitutes to jail detention (e.g., 
house arrest), if it is possible to determine that the offender is not a danger to 
himself or to other people. The initiation of a Hodna process can be used by a 
defendant to argue persuasively in court that there is no cause for detention (Pely, 
2008). While men tend to see this as part of the ongoing reconciliation process, 
women are said (by men mostly, but also by some women) to have greater diffi-
culty accepting the fact that the offender will not remain under lock and key for 
the duration of his (state-initiated) trial and for the duration of the Sulha process 
(Khneifess, Pers. Comm. July 24, (2007)). 
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Financing the Atwa (Token of Good Will) 
Sometimes, the men-folk of the offender' s family are temporarily or chronically 
unemployed (unemployment in Israel ' s Arab sector is very high at approximately 
40%). In such cases, it often falls to the women of the family to go out to bring 
the funds required for the Atwa (token of good will)-a payment by the offend-
er ' s family, designed to symbolize an assumption of responsibility on their part, 
and to ensure their cooperation with the Jaha ' s work and verdict (F. Khneifess 
2009, Pers . Comm. 14 June; XXX 2009, Pers. Comm. 3 June1\ 
Women's Influence on Sulha Deliberations 
Throughout the deliberations of the Sulha Committee, women have no formal 
access to it, and no formal influence on the process . Women, including mothers 
and wives of victims or offenders, and of course female witnesses to the events, 
are not eligible to testify formally in front of the Jaha, and are not allowed to 
participate in the meetings with the Jaha, as members of the disputant's family 
group. 
Yet, women apparently participate in Sulha deliberations informally. In an 
interview with Farage Khneifes, a Jaha member from the town of Shefaamer, 
near Nazareth, Khneifess indicated that women are often involved indirectly: 
"The male members go home, and come back to us the next day with a complete-
ly different idea or attitude, and we know that they had a discussion with their 
wives, and are now actually representing them in the discussion." He added: "Of 
course, a man would never admit that the idea is not his but his wife ' s, but we 
can already distingu ish between them" (F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. June 14, 
2009). 
XXX, the mother of a perpetrator, said in an interview that she received no 
information about the Sulha process from her husband (who was part of the fami-
ly 's delegation), but that she regularly contacted members of the Jaha, mostly at 
night, and that she heard from them about the evolution of the process. A mem-
ber of the Jaha that conducted the Sulha, in which the woman ' s son was in-
volved, corroborated the evidence. He also indicated that this is not a unique 
instance of informal contact between women-folk and members of the Jaha. 
So it appears that in some cases women and Jaha members communicate 
informally throughout the process-mostly when and where women press for 
such communication. 
Such input allows women to convey their attitudes and desires to the Jaha, 
and even (as we shall see below) exert some influence over the process of the 
15 XXX is the mother of a person considered (and judged in fo rmal court) to be responsible for the 
"!l ing of another person. Therefore. she belongs to the perpetrator' s clan. 
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Sulha (through the Jaha member they are in contact with), without breaking any 
taboos. 
Women's Influence on Sulha Agreements 
After hearing the disputants and consulting extensively with them, interview-
ing all the available witnesses (male only), and discussing the subject at length, 
examining precedence, Sharia (Islamic law), and the unique aspects of the case 
on hand, the Jaha finally nears the end of its deliberative stage. The end product 
of the entire process is the Sulha Agreement, a concise and ritualistic document 
that encapsulates tradition, reality, economics, emotions and, most of all , a view 
to the future. 
Women are formally excluded from participation in the composition of the 
Sulha Agreement as well. But informally, it turns out from information gathered 
from women, men and Jaha members, women make a significant contribution 
into the crafting (and later also the execution) of the Sulha Agreement. 
Fairouz Yassin from the village of Arabe, a university-educated accountant 
(Muslim), and member of the board of the city of Acre Women's Association 
Pedagogical Center, described a dispute she was familiar with, between two parts 
of the same family. The dispute involved a cousin murdering his uncle during a 
property-related argument. Since both families lived literally in the same building 
(a recurring situation in israel's Arab community), the Jaha instructed the alleged 
murderer's family to leave the village immediately and take up residence in an-
other village. 
Through male relatives, the widow of the victim conveyed to the Jaha that 
she would not accept any Sulha Agreement that allowed the murderer's family to 
return to the village--ever. Her argument was that the presence of the murderer 's 
family in close proximity to hers would both remind her forever of her misfor-
tune, and also serve as a constant irTitant to her children as they grew up, perhaps 
even leading to an attempt at revenge. 
The Jaha agreed (informally, of course, since doing so formally would erode 
its position significantly), and instructed the murderer' s family to relocate per-
manently to another village (F. Yassin 2009, Pers. Comm. 5 June). 
Here we have an indirect, yet significant influence of a woman on the 
Sulha's resultant agreement. Although the Jaha did not hear the widow directly, 
her representation by her male relatives was sufficient in this case. It is worth 
noting that the widow's male relatives most probably supported her position. 
Often, male relatives are reluctant to appear to be compromising their dominant 
posture by allowing any input by women-folk, or "complicating" the pending 
agreement. Had they not supported the woman 's position, there would have been 
no reason for them to represent her conditions to the Jaha and to negotiate suc-
cessfully for the acceptance of these conditions. 
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Also, it is important to note that exile is a tool used sparingly by the Jaha, 
and permanent exile is used even less often. 
Farage Khneifes, a veteran Sulha maker, described a situation where the Jaha 
initiated an indirect, and informal consultation with the widow of the victim, in 
order, as he put it: "to make sure that her sons do not grow up feeding on her 
resentment and hiring an assassin as soon as they are of an age and have the 
money to do so" (F. Khneifess 2009, Pers. Comm. 14 June). In practice, what 
took place, according to Khneifes, is that the Jaha consulted a male relative of the 
widow regarding the evolving fonnat of the agreement. Only after the widow 
reportedly gave her blessing to the tentative agreement, the Jaha proceeded to 
make it final. 
Women's Influence on Post-Sulha Inter/Intra Communal Reconciliation 
Apart from the pre-Sulha venting stage, the only other stage where women have a 
formally accepted role in Sulha is in the post-Sulha reconciliation stage. After a 
Sulha Agreement and ceremony, it is time for the disputants' families to statt 
reconstructing the fabric of cooperation and neighborliness that may have existed 
before the dispute. This is a crucial element in the lives of many Arab communi-
ties, who live in crowded, sometimes isolated conditions, and must be able to 
reconstruct their communal relations if they want to successfully cohabit follow-
ing a dispute (F. Khneifess 2009, Pers. Comm. 14 June; Jabbour, 1993). 
For women, the centers of their social network are their respective homes, 
homes of female blood relatives (e.g. , sisters) who may sometimes be married 
into the disputant's family, and the homes of other female relatives and friends, 
who may be associated (through blood, friendship or marriage relations) with the 
disputant ' s family. Women are expected to use these social networks to establish 
a healing process between the disputant families , first through small-scale meet-
ings of female members, bringing their children along to start socializing again 
with the "other side." Later on, such social interactions are expected to expand to 
larger meetings, including men, at celebrations, ritual meals and other traditional 
and family-related events (e.g., religious feasts, ceremonies to celebrate the birth 
of a new family member). 
There is an interesting paradox here between the insistence of many Sulha 
makers that women act, almost always, as obstacles to reconciliation because of 
their "emotional" atti tudes, and their (the women ' s) desire to see the family of 
the perpetrator suffer the consequences of the deed, and the reliance of the same 
ulha makers (and the community at large) on women when it comes to re-
establishing inter, and intra-hamuli relations following a Sulha Agreement. A 
possible explanation is the need to reconcile patriarchal taboos with communal 
realities. The "disruption" narrative supports the former, while the recruitment of 
women for post-Sulha reconciliation reflects the later need . 
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Conclusions 
The case studies describing the post-dispute exile of extended families from their 
homes demonstrated the negative impact of this process on families in general 
and on the women of these families in particular. Such dislocations obviously 
have a psychological, economic, and social impact on the effected women as well 
as on the entire family group. Indeed, there are nascent signs of unwillingness by 
women to silently accept such broad edicts. It is doubtful that opposition by 
women to forced exile will bear fruit, but in a strict patriarchal society, even the 
fact that women are voicing their opposition publicall/ 6 is significant. As we 
have seen, Sulha makers are conscience of the disruption caused by exile and in 
view of the public opposition to it by women, and may exercise more restraint 
before imposing exile, though it is clear that the practice will not stop in the fore-
seeable future . 
An examination of women ' s role within the Sulha ' s specific stages demon-
strated that women ' s informal participation and influence extends throughout the 
process, from the pre-Sulha stage of venting, through influence on the determina-
tion of the makeup of the Sulha Committee, to behind-the-scene involvement in 
the deliberation, testimony giving stage, on through influencing the evolving 
Sulha Agreement, and culminating with the important task of assisting the dispu-
tant families heal the rift, following the formal reconciliat ion and the Sulha cer-
emony. 
This paper demonstrates that despite the fact that women are formally ex-
cluded from most parts of the Sulha dispute resolution process, they actually 
participate in each part ofthe tradition informally but significantly. 
This analysis informs both our specific understanding of the Sulha, and our 
familiarity with possible interactions between formal and informal applications in 
traditional dispute management/resolution settings. Furthermore, it sheds light on 
an apparent gender-based " iceberg" characteristic of the Sulha, where the visi-
ble-men-only-part resides on top of a "sunken," invisible, unacknowledged 
formally, yet active, integral and relevant, participation of women in the process. 
Such insight may indicate that in the examination of traditional dispute reso-
lution processes (particularly, but not only in strict patriarchal settings), their 
outcome and post-resolution evolution, it may be relevant for the observer to 
seek an understanding of the "invisible" (informal) impact of women, in addition 
to locating and analyzing the formal, male-only segment of the practice. 
16 http ://www.haaretz.eo.il/misc/1 .1552170 (Hebrew) 
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